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Abstract 
 
The DOE Handbook, DOE-HDBK-3010-94, provides bases for evaluating respirable release 
fractions (RRFs) from accident releases of superheated fluids (flashing fluids). The Handbook 
includes flashing RRFs for catastrophic failures, small diameter jet sprays and boiling pools. 
Estimation of the RRF is important in quantifying consequences and identifying controls for 
preventing or mitigating a potential release. However, the Handbook does not provide sufficient 
details to estimate RRFs for a continuous range of fluid superheat (temperature), a continuous 
range of break sizes and locations (small, medium large and below, at or above liquid levels), or 
fluid properties (such as slurries versus solutions). In addition, evaluation of scaling effects of the 
data is not presented (scalability of small scale tests to full scale designs). This paper presents a 
methodology for evaluating the RRFs from flashing releases of hazardous superheated slurries 
based on the safety analysis work done on the Sludge Treatment Project (STP) at Hanford and 
presents solutions for a range of break sizes and locations.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Hanford K Basin Closure Project involves the retrieval, transfer and processing of 
radioactive contaminated slurries containing partially corroded spent nuclear fuel from the K 
Basin spent fuel pools. The spent fuel is primarily metallic fuel from the operation of the 
Hanford reactors. The Sludge Treatment Project is being designed to treat and package this 
material in preparation for ultimate disposal. The processing of the contaminated slurries 
includes further corrosion of the remaining uncorroded uranium metal in a heated pressure vessel 
to form a more stable metal oxide for packaging and storage. The corrosion process parameters 
used for the safety basis development were 1.65 MPa (225 psig) and 185
0
C (365
0
F).  
Accident analysis to support the design process and PDSA required computing the potential 
respirable release fractions RRFs for the release of superheated slurry streams from the heated 
vessel. This involved reviews of available literature on release of superheated fluids, 
development of an analysis matrix for the potential release sizes and locations, and development 
of correlations for estimating the RRFs for differing break sizes including the effects of 
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scalability of the test data. The methodology presented defines a 3x3 matrix of accidents for the 
release of superheated fluids from a heated vessel. This work extends the bases provided in the 
DOE Handbook for the evaluation of RRFs from superheated fluids. 
 
DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT SELECTION 
Within the STP system design, the location of a flashing release accident is limited to the 
Corrosion Vessel Pressure Boundary (CVPB) as this is the only region that is both pressurized 
and heated. This boundary includes the corrosion vessel (CV) and connecting piping from the 
vessel wall penetration to the isolation valves in the pipe. The potential leak or failure points 
within the CVPB are essentially defined by three locations; 1) above the CV liquid level (vessel 
wall or connecting pipe), 2) at the CV liquid level interface (vessel wall only), and 3) below the 
CV liquid level (vessel wall or connecting pipe). The largest pipe penetration below the water 
line is a 1.5in (38.1mm) diameter pipe. The largest pipe penetration above the water line is a 
1.5in (38.1mm) diameter pipe, excluding the non-pipe penetrations such as the agitator shaft 
penetration (>6 in) and other sealed access ports.  
 
The hazard analysis examined the potential for uncontrolled releases during the corrosion 
process to identify the variety of potential releases for the purpose of selection a set of design 
basis accidents (DBA). Initially, a catastrophic rupture of the corrosion vessel at corrosion 
temperature and pressure was examined as the potential DBA for corrosion. However, as the 
accident analysis progressed, it became apparent that the phenomena associated a catastrophic 
rupture (a rapid depressurization of the system in less that 100 seconds) did not address potential 
phenomena associated with smaller failure and associated longer term releases. 
By iterating with the accident analysis, the hazardous conditions for corrosion were eventually 
grouped under three DBAs: 
1. Small Break: Small Leak below the liquid level (This release is treated as a flashing jet 
and is the bounding dose consequence.) 
2. Medium Break: Double Ended Pipe Break below the liquid level (This release is treated 
as a flashing jet up to 1.5‟‟ in diameter) 
3. Catastrophic Break: Catastrophic Vessel Rupture (This release is treated as a 
sudden/catastrophic failure in the vessel head space) 
The fluid being released in each of these accidents consists of a slurry of water and sludge. The 
sludge, defined as any particulate which can pass through a ¼” strainer, consists of fuel corrosion 
products (including metallic uranium, and fission and activation products), small fuel fragments, 
iron and aluminum oxide, resin beads, concrete grit, sand, dirt, operational debris and biological 
debris. There are three “types” of sludge each with a different density and radioactive content, 
and the solids content of any particular corrosion batch is variable. The particle size distribution 
for the post corrosion slurry is not defined and one of the challenges was to identify an 
acceptable approach for quantifying the potential RRF for each of these DBAs. 
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RRF COMPUTATIONAL APPROACH  
 
Summary of Analysis Approach 
 
The RRF is a combination of the Airborne Release Fraction (ARF) and Respirable Fraction (RF) 
used in the common five factor release approach to compute respirable amount of material 
released (Q) (e.g., Q = MAR*DR*ARF*RF*LPF)
1
. The corrosion process will reduce the 
potential particulate size in the slurry. It was conservatively assumed that all post-corrosion 
particulates will be of a respirable size. Superheated liquid leaks that occur below the CV liquid 
level are bounded by the small flashing leak, and therefore only a small flashing leak was 
analyzed for flashing liquid jet releases. The intermediate or medium size breaks, up to a 
guillotine rupture of the largest pipe, is bounded by the small leak. In addition, the consequences 
appear to asymptotically approach the results of a catastrophic failure as the break size is 
increased. Therefore, the medium sized leaks were not explicitly evaluated. Leaks that occur in 
the vapor space are bounded by the catastrophic failure. However, this is a complete release that 
is virtually instantaneous and is applicable to a lower head failure or vessel side wall failure (that 
are catastrophic failures and not small leaks). It is argued that the RRF is dependent upon the 
orientation of the catastrophic break for the liquid depth normal to the release direction. The 3x3 
matrix provided below that describes the potential break locations and analysis approaches used 
(Table 1) for each. Note, these discussions include STP design specific considerations not 
provided in detail here. 
 
Table 1. Combinations of Break Sizes and Locations 
 Below the Liquid level At the Liquid level Above the Liquid level 
Small Break This release is treated as a 
flashing jet and is the 
bounding flashing release. A 
small leak maximizes the 
RRF as both thermal and 
mechanical breakup 
mechanism can be important. 
The low volumetric release 
rate allows for minimum self-
interference of respirable 
droplets material being 
released (droplet collisions 
and agglomeration). In 
addition, the low volumetric 
release rate allows the N2 
sparge system to maintain 
system pressure, and heaters 
to maintain temperature, until 
all liquid contents are 
released. 
This release is bounded by the 
small leak below the water 
level. The initial phase of the 
transient would be similar to a 
leak below the water line. 
However, as level decreases, it 
would reduce to an 
entrainment type release with 
lower RRF (see “Above the 
Liquid Level”). 
This release would be treated 
as entrainment of droplets in 
the flowing offgas system. A 
small leak in the vapor space 
of the vessel leads to either a 
slow depressurization or no 
depressurization, depending 
upon leak size (normal offgas 
flow is >15 cfm). RRFs would 
be low as the dominant release 
mechanism would be surface 
bubbling creating aerosols 
with entrainment in the offgas 
flow. Surface bubbling would 
be mild and head space gas 
velocities would be low due to 
the slow depressurization. 
Medium Break This release is treated as a 
flashing jet. However, the 
This release is bounded by the 
small leak below the water 
This release would be treated 
as boiling release. The break 
                                                 
1
 MAR: material at risk, DR: damage ratio, LPF: leak path factor 
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Table 1. Combinations of Break Sizes and Locations 
 Below the Liquid level At the Liquid level Above the Liquid level 
flashing jet correlations were 
derived from data for 0.1-2 
mm diameter orifices and 
appear to under predict the 
RRF for break sizes of 38.1 
mm (1.5 in). Nagai et al. 
indicate an asymptotic 
behavior in the Sauter Mean 
Diameter (SMD) as 
superheat and orifice 
diameter increase, but there 
was insufficient date to 
adequately characterize the 
droplet distribution. 
Comparison against the small 
orifice correlations shows 
qualitative agreement that 
these larger leaks have a 
smaller RRF with deceasing 
trend as the leak diameter 
increases.  
level. The initial phase of the 
transient would be similar to a 
leak below the water line. 
However, as level decreases, it 
would degenerate to an 
entrainment type release with 
lower ARF*RF (see “Above 
the Liquid Level”). 
size would be large enough to 
depressurize the corrosion 
vessel as the vapor release rate 
would greatly exceed the 
normal N2 supply. A 1.5 in 
diameter break would release 
~1040 cfm of steam/N2. 
However, as the system 
depressurizes the release rate 
would follow the vapor 
generation/flashing rate of the 
liquid in the vessel as it cools 
(plus the N2 supply flow). 
Ultimately this would drop to 
only the N2 flow if no heat is 
added as the liquid cools to 
100C, or with heat, the steam 
rate would balance the heat 
rate of the heaters. At 100 kW, 
the steaming rate would be 
~0.05 kg/s (~177 cfm at 1atm).  
Catastrophic 
Break 
This release is a vessel lower 
head failure. While this may 
not appear to mimic the 
reference DOE-HDBK-3010-
94 experiments for head 
space failures, this is simply 
an extension of a head space 
failure with a full vessel. 
However, this release would 
be an inherent „downward 
release‟ that could be argued 
to impact a physical structure 
(i.e. the ground) that would 
act to reduce the respirable 
release fraction. Therefore, it 
is considered to be bounded 
by the head space failure 
(failure above the liquid 
level). 
This release is a vessel wall 
failure that discharges 
sideways. While a radial 
unzipping may appear to be 
different than an axial failure, 
the release is still a 
catastrophic failure with liquid 
depth normal to the direction 
of the release (the vessel ID). 
The liquid is rapidly ejected 
from the side of the vessel 
forming potentially a fan 
shape instead of a cone or 
cylinder. However, the vessel 
geometry (90in ID, or 2.3m) is 
such that the diameter is larger 
than the liquid depth (~2m) 
assumed in the analysis and 
phenomena arguments suggest 
that the respirable release is a 
function of the liquid depth 
normal to the direction of 
release for a catastrophic 
failure. 
This release is a vessel head 
space failure that mimics the 
data set from the reference 
DOE-HDBK-3010-94 
experiments with a MAR and 
rupture size ~4-5 orders of 
magnitude larger. Plots show 
an inverse relationship 
between the MAR volume and 
RRF. This is attributed to the 
speed of the release and free-
surface to volume ratio 
(inherent self-shielding) for 
the surface normal to the 
release direction. Rapid 
depressurization ejects all the 
material and creates extremely 
high particulate densities. As 
fluid flashes, the free surface 
has a large mean free path to 
the environment and respirable 
droplets easily escape. 
However, flashing liquid in the 
lower vessel volume is still 
surrounded by large quantities 
of liquid resulting in more 
collisions and agglomeration 
than for droplets created near 
the „original‟ liquid surface. 
 
STP System Design Considerations 
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Ambient pressure during operation is 1 atm, with a saturation temperature of 100ºC. The STP 
nominal operating process temperature is 185ºC, and the nominal process pressure is 225 psig. 
This process pressure corresponds to a saturation temperature of 203ºC. A reasonably bounding 
maximum process temperature of 203ºC (103ºC superheat) was defined for the accident analyses 
and is well above the thermal shatter criteria for water.  
 
The potential size of a leak or failure is categorized as small, medium or catastrophic. 
 
 Small leaks have been defined as on the order of <50-80mm2 in area (<8-10mm equiv. 
diameter). At 225psig, an 80mm
2
 rupture of a pipe below the vessel liquid level would 
blowdown at 30-50gpm (0.02-0.03m
3
/s). This is 3-5.5kg/s depending upon the slurry 
density, 1.0-3.0gm/cc. This would take several hours to empty the vessel liquid contents. 
An 80 mm
2
 rupture of a pipe above the vessel liquid level would release steam at ~73cfm 
(0.034m3/s) at ~8.3kg/m3. This is ~0.3kg/s and would take approximately 10x longer to 
remove the vessel contents (than the liquid release). At 73cfm of steam, this is a velocity 
of ~0.84cm/s in the vessel head space immediately above the liquid level (vertical flow in 
the 90in diameter vessel). 
 Medium leaks are defined as leaks >8-10 mm diameter up to a guillotine rupture of the 
largest pipe penetration (a 1.5in diameter leak, or 38.1mm). At 225psig, a guillotine 
rupture of a 1.5in diameter pipe penetrating below the vessel liquid level would 
blowdown at 400-700gpm (liquid phase). This is 45-75kg/s depending upon the slurry 
density, 1.0-3.0gm/cc. This would take several minutes to empty the vessel. A guillotine 
rupture of a pipe above the vessel liquid level would release steam at ~1040cfm 
(0.5m3/s) at ~8.3kg/m3. This is ~4kg/s and would take approximately 10x longer to 
remove the vessel contents (than the liquid release). At 1040cfm of steam, this is velocity 
of ~0.12m/s in the gas head immediately above the liquid level (vertical flow in the 90in 
diameter vessel). 
 A catastrophic failure is defined as a large break capable of releasing the vessel contents 
in a few seconds or less. For reasons specific to the STP accident analysis this is defined 
as a release <100 second (i.e. it was conservatively bounding to assume a catastrophic 
failure could take up to 100s to release the vessel contents). A 100s time frame for a 
liquid space release equates to ~1930mm
2
 (~50mm / 1.95in equiv. diameter). A 100s time 
frame for a vapor space release equates to ~2.1*10
4
mm
2
 (~164mm / 6.5in equiv. 
diameter) for steam flow only. 
 
Flashing Leak Characterization 
 
A flashing release is defined as a release of superheated liquid above a critical temperature that 
results in shattering of the liquid due to vapor expansion (thermal shattering). It is the liquid 
breakup and bubble bursting at surfaces that create respirable droplets. This can be for either 
stagnant pools (e.g. a vessel) with sudden depressurization or a jet from a pressurized leak. 
Brown and York, and others, have identified that the critical temperature to initiate thermal 
shattering for water is ~10ºC superheat (this process is at ~100ºC superheat).  
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The characterization of flashing leaks is divided into 3 broad categories; small leaks (<8-10 mm 
in diameter), medium leaks (up to a guillotine rupture of 1.5” diameter pipe), and large leaks 
(catastrophic vessel failure). The flashing phenomenon itself is similar between the different leak 
sizes (i.e. thermal shattering). However, other phenomena can become more or less important 
depending upon the slurry density and both the leak size and location (such as mechanical 
shattering, self shielding, etc.). Slurry density is important because as a droplet evaporates after 
release it is possible for densification to occur, inherently limiting the RRF of droplets. This is 
discussed in more detail in a second paper (Schmitt 2007). For small leaks, both thermal and 
mechanical breakup can be important. This is seen in the York-Brown and Bushnell-Gooderum 
data where the RF is a function of superheat and orifice diameter. Their experiments included 
orifice diameters primarily in the range of 0.02-0.06 inches (0.5-1.5mm). Correlating their data 
estimates a range of SMD of ~15m for a 2mm orifice to ~50m for an 8mm orifice. This is 
consistent with the observations of Touil (2004)
2
. Touil (2004) reported on flashing leaks and 
included data from Nagai et al. (1985) that extended to leaks 10mm in diameter. As the nozzle 
diameter and superheat increased, Nagai reported that the SMD appeared to reach an asymptotic 
value, and the limiting SMD for water was ~36.8 m. In addition, NUREG/CR-1607 reports an 
estimated range of droplet sizes for higher superheat (>300ºC superheat) that results in droplet 
sizes between 16 and 76 m for the assumption of homogeneous and inhomogeneous bubble 
nucleation, respectively. 
 
Unfortunately, the Nagai raw data could not be obtained and Touil did not include an evaluation 
of the droplet distribution which is needed to correlate the fraction of respirable sized droplets 
for larger diameter releases. Using a diameter of 38.1 mm (1.5 in), the small leak correlations 
give a SMD >200 for 100ºC superheat, nearly 3-6x larger than the NUREG/CR-1607 and Nagai 
data would indicate. The conclusion reached from this review is that for orifice (break) sizes 
larger than ~4mm the respirable release fraction is better represented by the Nagai limit. 
 
A superheated jet will expand due to the vapor formation from depressurization of the jet. At 
high superheat the jet will expand quickly to pressure equilibrium. The expansion process will be 
a thermodynamic non-equilibrium expansion, but the expansion at pressure equilibrium can be 
estimated assuming an isentropic expansion (~17% vapor) or isenthalpic (~20% vapor). The dose 
consequence assumes isentropic expansion as this was more conservative (steam venting 
calculations assumed isenthalpic expansion). At the STP superheat conditions the isentropic 
vapor formation is ~17% (mass) and the expansion is approximately 200/1. The two-phase jet 
will continue to expand at roughly a 10 degree half angle (ANSI/ANS-58.2) due to air 
entrainment, maintaining roughly a cylindrical shape. As the jet diameter is increased, the 
volume to surface ratio increases for a cylindrical release. Thus, as the material released 
increases a larger fraction of the droplets created are located within the cylinder of the two-phase 
jet. This would result in more droplet collisions and agglomeration during the initial expansion 
and throughout the two-phase jet expansion. Evaporation and condensation effects are treated 
separately, but the initial droplet distribution would be expected to show an increase in effective 
                                                 
2
 Touil reference provided by email communication with Bigot, Jean-Pierre, dated 3/6/2006, subject: background 
data for a paper, "Rain-out Investigation: Initial Droplet Size Measurement," by Jean-Pierre Bigot, Abdellah Touil et 
al. 
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droplet diameter (and SMD) with increasing jet diameter, resulting in a decrease in respirable 
fraction released. 
 
Catastrophic flash releases are analyzed using experimental data from DOE-HDBK-3010-94 
with a modification for scaling effects. A catastrophic flash release is essentially a rapid or 
sudden depressurization of a superheated, stagnant fluid (such as in vessel). The experiments 
used to define the RRF were performed in an 800mL vessel (NUREG/CR-4779). The vessel was 
a devise called the “pressurized-airborne release equipment” (PARE). In the experiments, as the 
volume of liquid was increased the RRF decreased by an apparent 1/volume relationship. 
However, after reviewing the performance the experiments the vessel diameter was held constant 
and only the depth of liquid (height) was varied in the experiments. Thus, only a 1/‟liquid height‟ 
relationship could be established.  
 
The formation of droplets during flashing (thermal shattering) is a surface effect and occurs 
when steam bubbles burst or shatter the liquid surface. When a deep pool of superheated liquid is 
depressurized the entire contents rapidly flash and expand. At the superheat temperatures 
associated with the corrosion process (185ºC), it would be expected that a majority (if not all) of 
the material initially in the vessel would be ejected given a catastrophic vessel failure. Surface 
breakup and droplet formation near the original liquid surface, or near the „outer surface‟ of the 
expanding /ejected flashing liquid can more easily escape to the environment than droplets 
formed internal to the flashing liquid mass. Surface breakup and the droplets formed in the 
interior of the flashing liquid are still surrounded by large quantities of liquid that did not flash, 
and are therefore more likely to collide/agglomerate with the surrounding liquid. For a fixed 
geometry (e.g. vessel diameter), as the depth of liquid is increased more of the droplets created in 
the interior of the flashing pool are removed (collide/agglomerate) due to the increase in total 
mass of non-flashed liquid (i.e. self-shielding), and a reduction in respirable fraction released.  
 
A plot of the experimental data is provided in Figure 1, showing the inverse relationship between 
release fraction and initial volume. Statistical analysis of the experimental data for different 
liquids (density and viscosity) supports the inverse relationship. Figure 1 is a plot of the 
bounding RRF from the PARE experiments (circle) versus the correlation for RRF (solid line). 
 
The RRF relationship is likely a function of the volume to surface ratio of the release (surface 
area normal to the release direction). For an initial cylindrical release shape (e.g. a vessel head 
failure), this degenerates to the depth of liquid. However, a release from the side of cylinder (a 
lateral unzipping of a vessel) would be expected to have a different dependency to the volume of 
liquid present. A bounding condition would be to assume a rectangular geometry where the 
opening is a rectangular shape. The volume to surface dependency would again be the depth of 
liquid, but for the lateral release of a cylindrical shape this would be the diameter of the vessel 
instead of the liquid depth. In this interpretation, a long narrow cylinder would have a larger 
release fraction than an equal volume cylinder that is shorter with a wider diameter. This would 
seem to be physically consistent. Qualitatively then, the geometry of a catastrophic failure that 
should yield the highest RRF is that geometry with the minimum liquid depth normal to the 
release direction. This discussion is only applicable to catastrophic, large releases. As the release 
size decreases it would reduce to a flashing jet release. This is physically consistent because as 
the release rate is slowed down, the residence time of the material released is short compared to 
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when the remaining material in the vessel is released and not available to interact/collide with 
droplets from the remaining material. This then reduces to the jet release as the diameter of the 
release decreases as well. 
 
Figure 1. Catastrophic Flash RRF Scaling 
 
The scaling of the experimental data is a concern. The corrosion vessel is 4-5 orders of 
magnitude larger than the experimental device. However, phenomenological arguments would 
support the conclusion that as more material is released greater self-shielding is inherent and the 
respirable release fraction should decrease. Statistical analysis of the experimental data for 
different liquids (density and viscosity) supports the inverse relationship. In addition, the plume 
dispersion modeling is considered very conservative as this release is not a true point source and 
the plume density would exceed the density of the air. A volume source could be credited and the 
high plume density near the source would allow for significant rainout to occur. 
 
The medium break sizes were not explicitly evaluated for dose consequences. Based on 
increasing Sauter Mean Diameter (SMD) and decreasing RRF with break size, it is argued that 
dose consequences for the medium size breaks are bounded by the small leaks and quickly 
approach the release consequences from a catastrophic failure. A Mathcad spreadsheet was 
developed to plot qualitative comparisons. A plot of the RRF for different breaks size is shown 
in Figure 2. The RRF for small leaks is plotted for diameters of 2, 3 and 4mm. The medium 
break size RRF was estimated using the SMD reported from Nagai, SMD = 36.8 μm, and an 
assumed lognormal droplet distribution similar to the small leaks (“Nagai data”). The 
catastrophic RFF is plotted for the scaled RRF of the vessel (“Catastrophic”).  Sludge properties 
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for the STP were used in this comparison. This comparison is used to support the conclusion that 
the medium break sizes could be classified as the same dose consequence category as the large 
leaks and did not require explicit analysis. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Comparison of RRF for Small and Large leaks 
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